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 Counsel for Appellees 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
McKee, Chief Judge:  
 
Taibu Grant appeals the District Court‟s denial of the 
habeas petition he filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We granted 
a certificate of appealability to allow Grant to appeal the 
District Court‟s rejection of his claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct without holding an evidentiary hearing and his 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Although we 
agree with the court‟s rejection of Grant‟s prosecutorial 
misconduct claim, we hold that Grant was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  We will 
therefore remand to the District Court, which is directed to 
grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.  
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. 
 
 Grant was sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury 
convicted him of the first-degree murder of Keith Gilliam.  
Gilliam was fatally shot outside the Where It‟s At Bar (the 
“Bar”) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania around midnight on 
January 8, 1997.  That evening, Gilliam picked up his wife 
from work and then went to the Bar, where they spent about 
two hours before leaving to return home.  As Gilliam was 
walking to his car, a lone gunman approached him on foot 
and opened fire just outside the Bar, killing Gilliam and 
wounding another person, Leo Butler.  Four or five minutes 
later, more shots were fired from a maroon Buick that drove 
by.  Those shots wounded two others in front of the Bar.   
 
Police subsequently gathered fifteen shell casings, four 
bullets and some bullet fragments from the crime scene.  All 
the shell casings were found in the street, at the intersection 
of Lincoln and Lemington Avenues.  A forensic analysis 
revealed that all fifteen shell casings had been discharged 
3 
 
from the same firearm, but police never recovered the weapon 
that fired them.  A maroon Buick Skylark, matching the 
description of the car from which the second round of shots 
was fired, was found after the shooting.  Two latent 
fingerprints were recovered from the car, but neither of them 
matched Grant‟s prints.  The car had been reported stolen and 
police questioned Clarence Dumas about the car theft.  
However, Dumas was not arrested or charged in connection 
with the car theft or the shooting incident.  
 
Grant was convicted of killing Gilliam based primarily 
on the testimony of one Commonwealth witness, Christopher 
Moore.  Moore was the only witness who identified Grant as 
the person who fired the fatal shots at Gilliam.  Moore lived 
in an apartment building about 230 feet from the Bar, on the 
opposite side of Lincoln Avenue.  Moore testified that he 
heard shots as he was leaving his apartment building that 
night.   When he looked in the direction of the shots, he saw a 
man in the parking lot of the Open Pantry Food Mart, 
shooting towards the Bar.  The Open Pantry is directly across 
the street from the Bar.  Moore testified that although he 
could not see the shooter‟s face, he could see that the shooter 
was wearing a blue, hooded coat, with what appeared to be a 
four-inch wide horizontal stripe of a lighter color.  Moore 
testified that he lost sight of the shooter briefly but several 
minutes later, after Moore walked to the corner of Manning 
and Montezuma Streets, he saw Grant wearing the same 
clothing Moore had seen on the shooter.  Moore said he heard 
Grant yell, “I had to let loose on them niggers,” to someone 
standing behind him.   
 
Another prosecution witness, Robert Gilbert, testified 
that he was heading towards the Bar on the night at issue, and 
was at Manning and Montezuma Streets when he saw Grant 
walking towards him in a blue North Carolina jacket.  
Gilbert‟s testimony, however, did not directly link Grant to 
the crime.  
 
No one else identified Grant as the shooter or placed 
him at the scene of the shooting.  On the contrary, 
eyewitnesses who were in front of the Bar when the shooting 
took place testified that Grant was not the man who shot 
Gilliam.  Leo Butler was wounded by the first shooter.  He 
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testified that the first shooter was standing at a stoplight by 
Lincoln and Lemington Streets (where the shell casings were 
later found), and that the shooter was not Grant.  Gerald 
Bonner was in front of the Bar, speaking with Butler, when 
Gilliam was shot.  Bonner also testified that the shooter was 
not Grant.  Two other eyewitnesses — Kim Oden and Mark 
Gee — were present when Gilliam was killed.  Neither was 
called as a witness at trial, but both later swore in affidavits 
that they saw the first and second shooter, respectively, and 
that the shooter was not Grant.  Thus, aside from Moore, no 
one implicated Grant in the shooting.  
 
B. 
 
Grant raised a number of issues on direct appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court.  The Superior Court first denied 
Grant‟s petition to have the case remanded to the trial court 
for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel‟s ineffectiveness.  
However, that court later remanded to the trial court to allow 
Grant to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.  The Superior 
Court otherwise affirmed the trial court and denied Grant‟s 
remaining claims.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
subsequently affirmed the Superior Court‟s decision.  In 
doing so, the Court held for the first time that claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be raised in 
the first instance in post-conviction proceedings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A. 2d 726 (Pa. 2002). 
 
On remand, the trial court denied Grant‟s post-
sentence nunc pro tunc challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and the Superior Court subsequently affirmed.  
Grant then filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post 
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et 
seq., in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (the 
“PCRA Court”).  Counsel was subsequently appointed and 
Grant‟s PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition.1     
 
                                                          
1
  Grant raised a number of claims in his PCRA 
petition, but we discuss here only those claims that remain at 
issue in this appeal.   
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Two of Grant‟s claims before the PCRA Court relate 
to Moore‟s criminal history.  Moore had been convicted of a 
theft and a burglary in 1983.  The trial court had excluded any 
mention of these convictions at trial because they were over 
ten years old.  However, after the trial, Grant discovered that 
Moore had another burglary conviction in 1983 and two drug 
convictions in 1993, including one felony drug conviction.  
Grant also discovered that Moore had been on parole for the 
1993 drug convictions when Gilliam was shot and when 
Moore testified as a Commonwealth witness at Grant‟s trial in 
1997.   
 
Grant argued that Moore violated his parole by being 
at a bar on the night of the shooting and subsequently agreed 
to testify against Grant in exchange for leniency with respect 
to his parole violation.  In state court, Grant framed the issue 
of Moore‟s undisclosed criminal history and parole status as 
either prosecutorial misconduct under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963), or ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The Superior 
Court denied Grant‟s Brady claim because Grant‟s lawyer 
could have discovered Moore‟s criminal history and parole 
status with due diligence.  See United States v. Starusko, 729 
F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he government is not 
obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information 
which he already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he 
can obtain himself.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
The PCRA Court also denied Grant‟s claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to fully investigate 
Moore‟s criminal history and parole status.  The PCRA Court 
based that holding on its belief that Grant had not presented 
any evidence that Moore was actually on parole during the 
relevant time periods or that Moore received any favorable 
treatment by the Commonwealth in exchange for testifying 
against Grant.  The court reasoned that Grant had therefore 
failed to establish the prejudice required to obtain relief for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687 (“[T]he defendant must show that counsel‟s performance 
was deficient [and] that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.”).   
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Grant also argued that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call Kim Oden and Marc Gee as witnesses.  As we 
will describe in further detail, in a subsequent affidavit, Oden 
affirmed that she saw the first shooter and that shooter was 
not Grant.  Oden‟s description of the shooter‟s clothing also 
contradicted Moore‟s description of the shooter‟s clothing.  In 
his post-trial affidavit, Gee swore that he witnessed the shots 
fired from the Buick, and that the second shooter was not 
Grant either.  The PCRA Court denied relief on this claim 
because it concluded that Grant had not established that trial 
counsel knew of the existence of these witnesses or that the 
witnesses were “ready, willing, and able to testify” at the time 
of Grant‟s trial.  Commonwealth v. Grant, No. CC199701537, 
at 3-4 (Ct. C.P. Allegheny Cnty. Oct. 2, 2007). 
 
The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA Court‟s denial 
of relief on the basis of the PCRA Court‟s reasoning.  
Commonwealth v. Grant, No. 1581 WDA 2007 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 6, 2008).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
subsequently denied leave to appeal.  Commonwealth v. 
Grant, No. 529 WAL 2008 (Pa. Sept. 15, 2009). 
 
Having exhausted his state court remedies, Grant then 
filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the 
District Court.  As we noted at the outset, the District Court 
denied Grant‟s request for an evidentiary hearing on his 
prosecutorial misconduct claim and affirmed the Superior 
Court‟s denial of relief on all of Grant‟s remaining claims.  
 
The District Court adopted the reasoning of the PCRA 
court in denying relief on Grant‟s prosecutorial misconduct 
and ineffective assistance claims relating to Moore‟s criminal 
history and parole status.  The District Court rejected Grant‟s 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective in not calling Oden 
and Gee because, inter alia, their testimony would have been 
cumulative, as other witnesses had already testified that Grant 
was not the shooter.  Grant v. Lockett, No. 2:10-cv-785, 2010 
WL 3259852 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2010).   
 
A panel of this court subsequently granted a certificate 
of appealability as to the following three issues:   
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(1)  Whether the Magistrate Judge 
abused his discretion by denying Grant 
an evidentiary hearing regarding his 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct for 
failure to disclose Christopher Moore‟s 
full criminal history;  
 
(2)  Whether trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to 
investigate Moore‟s criminal history; and 
 
(3)  Whether trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to call 
witnesses Kim Oden and Mark Gee. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
 
 
We review the District Court‟s denial of an evidentiary 
hearing for abuse of discretion.  Morris v. Beard, 633 F.3d 
185, 193 (3d Cir. 2011).  Where, as here, the District Court 
does not hold an evidentiary hearing and dismisses a habeas 
petition based on a review of the state court record, we apply 
a plenary standard of review.  Duncan v. Morgan, 256 F.3d 
189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001).  “Accordingly, we will review the 
state courts‟ determinations under the same standards that the 
District Court was required to apply, which are the standard 
set forth in” the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.  Brown v. 
Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 627 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
 AEDPA places substantial limitations on a federal 
court‟s power to grant habeas relief to persons in state 
custody.  Federal courts may only consider petitions that 
allege that the petitioner is being held in state custody “in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).   AEDPA also requires that “a 
determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be 
                                                          
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254(a).  This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).   
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presumed to be correct” and “[t]he applicant has the burden 
of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).  Finally, when 
a state court has adjudicated and rejected a petitioner‟s federal 
claim on the merits, the federal court may not grant the writ 
unless the state court decision “(1) . . . was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States; or (2) . . . was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.”  Id. § 2254(d).   
 
 “This is a difficult to meet and highly deferential 
standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands 
that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.  
The petitioner carries the burden of proof.”  Cullen v. 
Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, 
AEDPA‟s standard applies even where “the state court 
analyzed and rejected a habeas petitioner‟s federal claims on 
the merits but gave „no indication of how it reached its 
decision.‟”  Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 (3d Cir. 
2012).    
 Because the relevant Pennsylvania state court 
adjudicated Grant‟s prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on the merits, the strictures of § 
2254(d) govern our review of each of the issues raised here.  
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
Grant claims that he was denied a fair trial as a result 
of the Commonwealth‟s failure to disclose Moore‟s criminal 
background in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  As we explained above, Moore was the prosecution‟s 
key witness and the only witness who identified Grant as the 
shooter.  Grant argued that prosecutors failed to disclose three 
convictions on Moore‟s criminal record and failed to disclose 
that Moore was on parole at the time of the shooting and 
when he testified against Grant at trial.   
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The District Court agreed with the state court‟s 
conclusion that Grant‟s trial counsel could have discovered 
Moore‟s criminal history and parole status with reasonable 
diligence.  Accordingly, the District Court denied Grant‟s 
request for an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim and 
rejected the claim on the merits.  We agree that Grant was not 
entitled to a hearing on this record, and that his Brady claim 
lacked merit.  See Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 
1388 (2011).   
 
In Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that “review 
under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the 
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 
Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398.  Thus, “[if] a claim has been 
adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas 
petition[er] must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on 
the record that was before that state court.”  Id. at 1400.  The 
petitioner may not introduce new evidence before a federal 
habeas court.  Id.  In addition, review of a claim under § 
2254(d)(2) is specifically limited to “evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).  We 
have recently held that, as a general rule, “district courts 
cannot conduct evidentiary hearings to supplement the 
existing state court record under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”  
Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(finding Pinholster controlling and holding that the district 
court erred in conducting an evidentiary hearing).   
 
Grant‟s PCRA counsel was able to discover that 
Moore was on parole at the time of the shooting and when he 
testified against Grant.  Grant‟s trial counsel could also have 
accessed Moore‟s criminal history through the records kept 
by the Clerk of Court.  Indeed, it appears Grant himself 
obtained such records while in state custody.  It is therefore 
clear that trial counsel could have discovered Moore‟s parole 
status had he exercised reasonable diligence.  Accordingly, 
the District Court did not err in denying Grant‟s Brady claim 
on the merits without an evidentiary hearing.  See United 
States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
government is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant 
with information which he already has or, with any 
reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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B. 
 
Grant also argues that the Superior Court unreasonably 
applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in 
rejecting his ineffective assistance claims.  Grant first argues 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
investigate the criminal history and parole status of the 
Commonwealth‟s key witness, Christopher Moore.  Grant 
also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate and call Marc Gee and Kim Oden as defense 
witnesses.   
 
1.  AEDPA and Strickland Standards 
 
As we have explained, because Grant‟s ineffective 
assistance claims were adjudicated on the merits in state 
court, Grant may obtain federal habeas relief under AEDPA 
only if the state court decision was (1) “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also 
Pinholster 131 U.S. at 1398.    
 
A state court‟s decision is “contrary to . . . clearly 
established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1) “if the state court 
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in 
[the Supreme Court‟s] cases,” or “if the state court confronts 
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant 
Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to 
[that precedent].”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 
(2000).   
 
A state court‟s decision “involves an unreasonable 
application[] of clearly established Federal law”  where “the 
state court identifies the correct legal principle from [the 
Supreme] Court‟s decisions but unreasonably applies that 
principle to the facts of the prisoner‟s case.”  Siehl v. Grace, 
561 F.3d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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The Supreme Court established the legal principles 
governing Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Strickland sets forth a two-part test:   
 
First, the defendant must show that 
counsel‟s performance was deficient.  
This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  
 
Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that 
counsel‟s errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable.  
 
Id. at 687.  “Since Strickland, the Supreme Court and this 
Court have emphasized the necessity of assessing an 
ineffectiveness claim in light of all the circumstances.”  Siehl, 
561 F.3d at 195 (citing cases).    
 
When a federal habeas petition under § 2254 is based 
upon an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[t]he pivotal 
question is whether the state court‟s application of the 
Strickland standard was unreasonable,” which “is different 
from asking whether defense counsel‟s performance fell 
below Strickland‟s standard.”  Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. 
__, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011).  For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), 
“an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 
an incorrect application of federal law.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphases in original).  “A state 
court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in 
operation when the case involves [direct] review under the 
Strickland standard itself.”  Id.  Federal habeas review of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims is thus “doubly 
deferential.”  Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403.  Federal habeas 
courts must “take a highly deferential look at counsel‟s 
performance” under Strickland, “through the deferential lens 
of § 2254(d).”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   
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2.  Moore’s Criminal History 
 
As noted, the PCRA Court rejected Grant‟s claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover Moore‟s 
parole status because the court concluded that Grant 
“provide[d] no documentation that Mr. Moore was in fact on 
parole during the relevant time period [and] no 
documentation . . . that would lead anyone to think Mr. 
Moore was treated in a favorable fashion in return for his 
cooperation with law enforcement.”  Commonwealth v. 
Grant, No. CC199701537, at 5 (Ct. C.P. Allegheny Cnty. 
Oct. 2, 2007).  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed that 
ruling without further analysis.  The Superior Court 
concluded “that the trial court, in its memorandum and 
opinion . . . , ably and methodically reviewed the specific 
instances of alleged ineffectiveness raised by Grant and 
properly concluded that PCRA relief was not warranted.”  
Commonwealth v. Grant, No. 1581 WDA 2007, at 5 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2008).  On habeas review, the District 
Court similarly quoted the PCRA Court‟s reasoning and also 
denied relief without further analysis.  See Grant v. Lockett, 
No. 2:10-cv-785, 2010 WL 3259852, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
18, 2010).   
 
At the outset, we can readily dismiss the PCRA 
Court‟s conclusion that Grant submitted no documentation 
that Moore was on parole during the relevant period.  
Although this factual conclusion was adopted by the Superior 
Court on PCRA appeal and the District Court on habeas 
review, it is clearly an “unreasonable determination of the 
facts” under 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(2).  The criminal docket 
sheet and a number of other court documents associated with 
Moore‟s 1993 drug convictions were incorporated into the 
certified record through two PCRA court orders granting 
leave to supplement the record.
3
  The docket sheet in the 
                                                          
3
  On April 8, 2008, the PCRA Court granted leave to 
supplement the record with documents relating to Moore‟s 
1993 drug convictions.  On April 25, 2008, the PCRA Court 
vacated the April 8, 2008 order and issued a new order to 
reference the correct case number associated with Moore‟s 
convictions.   
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supplemented record before the Superior Court states that 
Moore was sentenced to three to six years imprisonment for 
the convictions at issue, effective August 14, 1992.   
 
Thus, it is beyond dispute that the state record 
supported Grant‟s claim that, since Moore was not still in 
prison at the time of the shooting and Grant‟s trial in 1997, 
Moore was on parole during that period.  Indeed, to its credit, 
the Commonwealth conceded this in its answer to Grant‟s 
habeas petition before the District Court and its brief on 
appeal.  Thus, despite the Superior Court‟s proclamation that 
it “thoroughly reviewed Grant‟s claims of trial counsel‟s 
ineffectiveness” and conducted “a meticulous review of the 
certified record and the briefs of the parties,” the Superior 
Court affirmed the PCRA Court‟s denial of relief through a 
wholesale adoption of that court‟s reasoning without 
appreciating, or even realizing, the undisputed fact that the 
record had been supplemented to include documents 
establishing Moore‟s 1993 convictions and resulting parole 
status.  See Commonwealth v. Grant, No. 1581 WDA 2007, at 
5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2008).  Rather, the Superior Court‟s 
factual determination simply ignored the evidence of Moore‟s 
parole status in the supplemented record and the Superior 
Court‟s decision, to the extent it relied upon this erroneous 
determination, “was based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).   
 
The PCRA Court‟s second basis for denying relief is 
no less troubling.  The PCRA Court reasoned that Grant was 
not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim because he presented no evidence that Moore had any 
deal with the Commonwealth or was otherwise treated 
favorably in exchange for his cooperation in Grant‟s trial.  
Grant does not contend, and there is no indication that, this 
second basis for the state court‟s decision is incorrect or was 
otherwise an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” under  
8 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
4
  However, this part of the PCRA 
                                                          
4
  Grant filed a pro se Motion for Expansion of the 
Record on May 26, 2011, seeking to present an affidavit 
signed by Moore on May 16, 2011.  The affidavit states that 
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Court‟s analysis is clearly an “unreasonable application of” 
Strickland under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
 
a.  Deficient Performance 
 
The state court does not appear to have ruled on 
whether trial counsel‟s performance was deficient.  As 
detailed above, the PCRA Court‟s analysis of Grant‟s 
ineffective assistance claim based on counsel‟s failure to 
investigate Moore‟s criminal history and parole status was 
sparse.  The state court‟s denial of relief on this claim 
appears to rest on the court‟s conclusion that Grant failed to 
show prejudice because he did not produce evidence of any 
“deal” offering Moore favorable treatment for testifying 
against Grant.  A “court need not determine whether 
counsel‟s performance was deficient before examining the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.   
 
However, on this record, it is clear that even if the state 
court had determined that Grant‟s trial counsel was not 
deficient in this regard, such a determination would be an 
unreasonable application of Strickland.  
 
Under Strickland‟s first prong, a court must determine 
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts 
                                                                                                                                  
Moore was on parole during Grant‟s trial.  Moore further 
affirms:  “Upon my arrest I was told that the DA new [sic] of 
my parole status, and also new [sic] that I was not suppose 
[sic] to be out side [sic] at the time of the shooting, and I was 
told that because of that I better co-operate [sic] fully.  All of 
this was discussed prior to Mr. Grant‟s trial.”  App. 99.  
Although this affidavit strongly suggests that Moore was 
under pressure from prosecutors to testify against Grant, it is 
not clear that we can now expand the state court record for 
the purposes of review under §2254(d); “[a]lthough state 
prisoners may sometimes submit new evidence in federal 
court” under AEDPA, Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1401, we need 
not address whether the circumstances here warrant 
admission of new evidence because, as we will explain, we 
conclude that Grant is entitled to relief even without this new 
affidavit. 
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or omissions of counsel were outside the range of 
professionally competent assistance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690.  Strickland also emphasizes that a court‟s evaluation of 
an attorney‟s performance must be “highly deferential” so as 
to diminish “the distorting effects of hindsight.”  Id. at 689.  
Thus, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel‟s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Id.  The Supreme Court has 
“declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate 
attorney conduct and instead [has] emphasized that „[t]he 
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.‟”  
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).   
 
Nonetheless, under Strickland, “counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  A key prosecution witness‟s 
prior criminal history and resultant parole status clearly 
constitute important impeachment evidence.  It is beyond the 
range of professionally reasonable judgment to forego 
investigation of, and impeachment based upon, such evidence 
absent some apparent strategic reason that might explain or 
excuse counsel‟s failure.  “Thus, viewed objectively, 
[Grant‟s] counsel unreasonably failed to introduce such 
impeachment evidence.”  Ross v. Dist. Att’y of the Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 672 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
trial counsel‟s failure to introduce evidence of prosecution 
witness‟s crimen falsi conviction constituted deficient 
performance).  Counsel‟s failure to make reasonable efforts to 
learn that Moore was on parole when he testified as the 
Commonwealth‟s key witness easily satisfies the first prong 
of Strickland.  A conclusion to the contrary would be an 
unreasonable application of Strickland.  However, Grant must 
also satisfy Strickland‟s prejudice prong. 
 
b.  Prejudice 
 
To show prejudice, the PCRA Court appears to have 
required Grant to introduce evidence that Moore had a special 
deal with, or was treated favorably by, the Commonwealth in 
exchange for his cooperation.  Since no such evidence was 
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introduced in the PCRA proceedings, the court concluded that 
the record did not support Grant‟s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  We are aware of no requirement that a 
defendant must introduce evidence of favorable treatment in 
return for testifying before the witness‟s subjective 
motivation for bias becomes relevant.
5
  The state court‟s 
imposition of such a requirement was an unreasonable 
application of Strickland.   
 
To show prejudice, Strickland requires a petitioner to 
show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
This requires more than just a “conceivable” likelihood of a 
different result.  Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 792.  However, a 
petitioner “need not show that counsel‟s deficient 
performance „more likely than not altered the outcome of the 
case‟ — rather he must show only „a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.‟”  Jacobs v. Horn, 395 
F.3d 92, 105 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
693-94).  Moreover, “ [t]he effect of counsel‟s inadequate 
performance must be evaluated in light of the totality of the 
evidence at trial:  „a verdict or conclusion only weakly 
supported by the record is more likely to have been affected 
by errors than one with overwhelming record support.‟”  
                                                          
5
  We do not suggest that the prosecutor made any 
offer of favorable treatment to Moore in exchange for his 
testimony. However, we do suggest that requiring evidence of 
such an agreement is as unrealistic as it is unreasonable.  We 
doubt that any experienced prosecutor would be so naïve as to 
expressly promise a witness favorable treatment as a reward 
for testifying against a defendant at trial.  The prosecutor 
would know that any such promise could be fatal to the 
witness‟s credibility upon cross examination by even a 
modestly competent defense attorney.  Although Moore 
testified that he had such an agreement in his affidavit, we 
will not attribute such tactics to a prosecutor absent more 
evidence than appears here.  Nevertheless, as we explain 
below, that is not the point.  The poison lurks in the bias that 
can arise from the witness‟s subjective state of mind, 
regardless of whether the witness‟s belief arose from an 
actual agreement with, or representation of, the prosecutor.  
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Rolan v. Vaugh, 445 F.3d 671, 682 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 710-11 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696)).   
 
The Supreme Court‟s decision in Davis v. Alaska, 415 
U.S. 308 (1974), is particularly instructive to our analysis of 
prejudice in Grant‟s case.  In Davis, the Supreme Court held 
that the Confrontation Clause requires that a criminal 
defendant be permitted to impeach the credibility of a 
prosecution witness with that witness‟s probation status as a 
juvenile delinquent, even though the state asserted a strong 
and valid interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile 
delinquency adjudications.  Id. at 319.   
 
The defense in Davis sought to cross-examine a 
prosecution witness about his parole status to show that the 
witness “might have been subject to undue pressure from the 
police and made his identifications under fear of possible 
probation revocation.”  Id. at 311 (emphases added).  Nothing 
in the Court‟s discussion or analysis in Davis suggests that 
there was any evidence that the witness actually had some 
kind of  “deal” or understanding with the prosecutor or that 
prosecutors had actually coerced the witness to implicate the 
defendant in exchange for favorable treatment regarding the 
probation. There was no suggestion of any quid pro quo, and 
the Court‟s analysis regarding the importance of cross-
examining the witness about his parole status did not turn on 
evidence of any quid pro quo.  Moreover, unlike Moore, the 
witness in Davis had actually been cross-examined about 
possible bias resulting from considerations other than his 
parole status.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that it 
was significant that the defense was prevented from 
“expos[ing] to the jury” the witness‟s parole status, from 
which the jurors “could appropriately draw inferences relating 
to the reliability of the witness.”  Id. at 318.   
 
Although the Supreme Court in Davis was resolving a 
claim under the Confrontation Clause, the Court‟s analysis of 
the importance of impeachment based on a witness‟s parole 
status is no less relevant to whether Grant established 
prejudice for the purposes of his Sixth Amendment claim 
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under Strickland.
6
  Davis held that the inability to expose a 
witness‟s parole status to the jury results in a denial of “the 
right of effective cross examination, which „would be 
constitutional error of the first magnitude.‟”  Id. at 318.    
 
Accordingly, the Superior Court‟s conclusion that 
Grant could not establish prejudice under Strickland unless he 
could show that Moore actually had some kind of deal with 
the prosecution is an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent.  Davis makes clear 
that, even if there is no evidence of any quid pro quo between 
Moore and the Commonwealth, it is the fact that Moore had a 
strong reason to lie, and to testify in a manner that would help 
the prosecutor, in the hopes of getting favorable treatment 
from the Commonwealth, that establishes the potential bias 
that would have been extremely compelling impeachment 
evidence.  Because of trial counsel‟s unreasonably deficient 
performance here, the jury was never informed of Moore‟s 
parole status and thus “could [not] appropriately draw 
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness[.]”  Davis, 
415 U.S. at 318.   
  
 As is clear from our discussion of the trial testimony, 
Moore was not just any Commonwealth witness.  He was the 
only witness to identify Grant as the shooter or otherwise 
directly implicate Grant in the incident.  The prosecutor‟s 
closing argument illustrates the importance of Moore‟s 
testimony and also shows that the Commonwealth‟s entire 
case rested squarely on the jury‟s assessment of Moore‟s 
credibility and absence of bias.  Thus, the prosecutor quite 
correctly told the trial court that Moore was “the most 
essential Commonwealth witness[,] [o]ne without [whom] 
this case probably couldn‟t proceed.”  Trial Tr. 394 (emphasis 
added).   
                                                          
6
  Indeed, a Confrontation Clause claim would not be 
viable under the facts of Grant‟s case as there is no allegation 
that the opportunity for effective cross-examination was in 
any way curtailed by a specific statutory or court-imposed 
restriction.  See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53-54 
(1987) (explaining that the Confrontation Clause is concerned 
primarily with “specific statutory or court-imposed 
restriction[s] at trial on the scope of questioning”).   
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As we explained earlier, Moore‟s testimony 
contradicted at least two other eyewitnesses who said that 
Grant was not the shooter.  These other eyewitnesses, unlike 
Moore, were actually at the Where It‟s At Bar when the 
shooting took place, and were close enough to actually see the 
shooter‟s face.  Leo Butler testified at trial that the first 
shooter was standing at the stoplight by Lincoln and 
Lemington, and that the shooter was not Grant.  Gerald 
Bonner testified at trial that he was in front of the Bar, 
speaking with Butler, when a man came around the corner 
and opened fire.  Bonner also testified that the shooter was 
not Grant.
7
  
 
No physical evidence linked Grant to the crime.  
Neither of the latent prints that were recovered from the 
Buick that was involved in the shooting matched Grant‟s 
prints.  If anything, the physical evidence in the case casts 
doubt on Moore‟s testimony.  Although Moore testified that 
he saw the shooter firing from the parking lot of the Open 
Pantry, all fifteen shell casings retrieved from the crime scene 
were found in the street.  No shell casings were found in the 
Open Pantry parking lot.  In addition, there was no evidence 
that Grant had any motive to kill Gilliam.  Indeed, the 
victim‟s wife testified that she and her husband knew Grant, 
and to the best of her knowledge, there was no “bad blood” 
between them.   
 
Without Moore, it is difficult for us to discern any 
basis for even charging Grant with the crime.  The 
Commonwealth‟s closing argument is revealing.  Out of thirty 
pages of transcript, the Commonwealth devoted over ten 
pages to discussing Moore‟s testimony and asserted that 
Moore‟s testimony alone is sufficient evidence to find Grant 
guilty.  Moore‟s credibility is the indispensable lynchpin of 
the Commonwealth‟s case.  Accordingly, in its closing 
                                                          
7
  In addition, as we explained, two eyewitnesses, Kim 
Oden and Marc Gee, were not called to testify at trial, but 
later swore in affidavits that they saw the first shooter who 
killed Gilliam and the second shooter who fired out of the 
maroon Buick, respectively, and Grant was not the shooter in 
either instance. 
20 
 
argument, the Commonwealth repeatedly argued that the jury 
should find Moore credible because he had no reason to lie.  
See, e.g., Trial Tr. 466 (“What reason would Mr. Moore have 
for getting on the witness stand and . . . telling the fourteen of 
you that that is the guy that I saw shooting on the corner[?]”); 
id. at 470 (“It can only be construed in that manner . . . back 
to Mr. Moore‟s motivation for getting on that witness 
stand.”); id. at 474 (“What motivation does Mr. Moore have 
to want to get up on that witness stand, ladies and gentlemen, 
and tell you what he saw and tell you how certain he was of 
what he saw?”); id. at 475 (“I submit to you there is no 
motivation here for [Moore] to get up there because he 
doesn‟t want to. . . .  Mr. Moore did it, and he got up there 
and he told you what he saw, and I submit to you that he is 
completely honest.”).  
 
The Commonwealth made these assertions despite the 
fact that Moore did have a very compelling reason to lie.  
However, because of defense counsel‟s deficient 
representation, Moore‟s reason to lie was never revealed to 
the jury.  The Commonwealth argues that trial counsel did not 
forego all impeachment of Moore, and we agree.
8
   However, 
the impeachment was limited to Moore‟s ability to perceive 
the events.  Specifically, trial counsel impeached Moore with 
the fact that the distance from Moore‟s apartment to the crime 
scene was approximately 230 feet and the shooting occurred 
in the wee hours of the morning, and with the fact that Moore 
had consumed alcohol prior to witnessing the shooting.   
 
However, the fact that Moore was on parole during all 
relevant periods, and therefore had a motive to curry the 
prosecution‟s favor, was never revealed to the jury.  Moore‟s 
credibility would have been significantly impugned but for 
trial counsel‟s unprofessional errors.  Thus, even though 
defense counsel did not completely forego all attempts to 
impeach the witness, here, as in Davis, the jury could not 
“make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on 
                                                          
8
  As we noted above, the defense counsel in Davis also 
impeached the credibility of the prosecutor‟s witness.  
Nonetheless, the Court still held that the failure to introduce 
evidence of his probation status was a constitutional defect in 
the proceedings. 
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[Moore‟s] testimony which provided „a critical link in the 
proof . . . of petitioner‟s acts.‟”  Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. 
 
As we have explained, “in considering whether a 
petitioner suffered prejudice, [t]he effect of counsel‟s 
inadequate performance must be evaluated in light of the 
totality of the evidence at trial:  „a verdict or conclusion only 
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been 
affected by errors than one with overwhelming record 
support.‟”  Rolan, 445 F.3d at 682 (quoting Gray, 878 F.2d at 
710-11 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696)).  Careful 
consideration of the totality of the evidence at trial here 
leaves us with no doubt that had trial counsel performed at an 
objectively reasonable standard, and had the jury been 
informed of Moore‟s parole status and resulting bias, it is 
“reasonably probable that . . . the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
Given the omission of that crucial evidence of a possible bias, 
the confidence in the verdict is greatly undermined.  
 
In fact, had the jury known of Moore‟s potential for 
bias, the Commonwealth‟s closing argument would have been 
deprived of its force because the jury would have had a 
compelling response to the Commonwealth‟s repeated 
hypothetical questions about why Moore would get on the 
witness stand and implicate Grant.  Even through the 
deferential lens of federal habeas review of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, it is clear that the Superior 
Court‟s conclusion that Grant failed to show prejudice was an 
unreasonable application of federal law.   
 
In sum, the Superior Court‟s conclusion that Grant 
presented no evidence that Moore was on parole during the 
relevant time period was an “unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).  Further, the 
Superior Court‟s conclusion that relief was not warranted 
because Grant presented no evidence that Moore received 
favorable treatment by the Commonwealth in exchange for 
his testimony against Grant “involved an unreasonable 
application of” Strickland.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
Accordingly, the District Court erred in rejecting Grant‟s 
claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in 
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failing to adequately investigate Moore‟s criminal history and 
parole status.   
 
2.  Witnesses Oden and Gee 
 
 Grant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate and call Mark Gee and Kim Oden as 
defense witnesses.  Gee and Oden worked at the Where It‟s 
At Bar and were present at the Bar on the night of the 
shooting.  Grant included affidavits from Gee and Oden with 
his PCRA petition.   
 
Kim Oden was a bartender at the Bar.  According to 
her affidavit, Oden was standing in front of the Bar, talking to 
Leo Butler, at approximately 11:00 p.m. on the night that 
Gilliam was shot.  She saw a maroon car drive past the bar 
and turn the corner.  Shortly thereafter, she saw a man walk 
around the same corner.  The man crouched down and began 
shooting at Oden and Butler.  Oden affirmed that the shooter 
was definitely not Grant and was much taller and heavier than 
Grant.  Oden described the shooter as wearing a black ski 
mask, a black leather jacket, black pants and black boots.  
Oden was interviewed by the Pittsburgh Police and told the 
officers her name and address, and that she had seen the first 
shooter but did not know or recognize him.  She also told the 
officers that she had not seen Grant that night and did not 
know where he was.  Defense counsel did not interview Oden 
before Grant‟s trial.   
 
Marc Gee also worked at the Where It‟s At Bar.  
According to his affidavit, Gee was inside the Bar, waiting to 
begin his bartending shift around 11:00 p.m., when someone 
came inside and shouted, “Keith is on the ground; there was a 
maroon car.”  Gee then went outside and saw a maroon car, 
with several black men inside, driving down the street in front 
of the bar.  Gee saw a black male in the passenger seat pull 
out a gun and begin shooting out of the passenger window.  
Gee affirmed that he had known Grant for about ten years and 
that the man shooting out of the maroon Buick was definitely 
not Grant.  The shooter was someone Gee had never seen 
before and had much lighter skin than Grant.  Gee was 
interviewed by police after the shooting and told them his 
name and address, and that he had seen the person shooting 
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out of the Buick but did not know or recognize him.  Gee also 
spoke with an attorney (presumably the prosecutor), and was 
subpoenaed to appear at Grant‟s trial.  However, while Gee 
was waiting in the court hallway, the attorney told him he was 
not needed and was dismissed.   
 
After reviewing the affidavits from Gee and Oden, and 
hearing Gee‟s testimony at an evidentiary hearing,9 the PCRA 
Court concluded that Grant‟s claim with respect to counsel‟s 
failure to investigate these witnesses had no merit.
10
 
 
Because we conclude that Grant is entitled to federal 
habeas relief based on trial counsel‟s failure to investigate 
Moore‟s criminal history and parole status, we need not 
address whether trial counsel‟s failure to investigate and call 
Oden and Gee as defense witnesses independently warrants 
                                                          
9
  Gee‟s testimony was taken for preservation at an 
evidentiary hearing during Grant‟s PCRA proceedings.  His 
testimony largely echoes his affidavit.  
10
  The PCRA Court explained that, to establish 
ineffectiveness for failure to call a witness under 
Pennsylvania law, Grant must show that “(1) the witness 
existed; (2) the witness was available; (3) counsel [knew] of 
the [witness‟s] existence; (4) the witness was prepared to 
cooperate and testify . . . ; and (5) the absence of the 
testimony was prejudicial.”  Commonwealth v. Khalil, 806 
A.2d 415, 522 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted).  
Applying this standard, the PCRA Court denied relief because 
it concluded that Grant had not established that trial counsel 
knew of the existence of Oden and Gee or that these 
witnesses were “ready, willing, and able to testify” at the time 
of Grant‟s trial.  Although, as we will explain, we need not 
address whether the state court unreasonably applied 
Strickland in denying relief on these grounds, we are troubled 
by the state court‟s requirement that Grant show that Oden 
and Gee were “ready, willing, and able to testify” at the trial.  
Absent extenuating circumstances, such as the existence of a 
privilege or the witness‟s incapacity or death, whether a 
witness is ready and willing to testify is irrelevant since 
defense counsel can compel testimony through a trial 
subpoena.   
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relief.  Nonetheless, we do note that Oden and Gee‟s 
affidavits add to the already significant evidence undermining 
the verdict against Grant.  They also add support to our 
conclusion that counsel‟s deficient performance with respect 
to Moore‟s parole status prejudiced Grant‟s defense.   
 
We are particularly troubled by the District Court‟s 
conclusion that Grant was not prejudiced by trial counsel‟s 
failure to call Oden and Gee because their testimony would 
have been “cumulative” since other witnesses already 
testified that Grant was not the shooter.  Gee and Oden‟s 
affidavits do not provide cumulative testimony on a collateral 
issue.  Rather, the affidavits present eyewitness accounts of 
the identity of the shooter.  It is hard to understand how 
having a third eyewitness testify that the defendant was not 
the shooter would have been “cumulative” and therefore 
inconsequential, as the District Court concludes.   
 
Moreover, Oden‟s description of the shooter‟s clothing 
sharply conflicts with Moore‟s description of what the 
shooter was wearing.  While Oden described the shooter as 
wearing a black ski mask, black leather jacket, black pants, 
and black boots, Moore testified that the shooter was wearing 
a blue, hooded coat, with a four-inch wide horizontal stripe in 
a lighter color.  Moore was only able to identify Grant as the 
shooter because he said he saw Grant wearing the same 
clothes as the person he saw shooting.  The fact that Oden, 
who, unlike Moore, was actually at the scene of the shooting 
and actually saw the shooter close-up, described the shooter 
as wearing different clothing further undermines Moore‟s 
identification of Grant and the reliability of the resulting 
verdict.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm in part 
and vacate in part the Judgment of the District Court.  This 
matter is remanded to the District Court with instructions to 
conditionally grant the writ of habeas corpus.  
 
